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Summary 
We provide a general framework in which to determine the optimal penalty fee inducing the 
contractor to respect the contracted delivery date in public procurement contracts (PPCs). We do 
this by developing a real option model that enables us to investigate the contractor’s value of 
investment timing flexibility which the penalty rule - de facto - introduces. We then apply this setting 
in order to evaluate the range of penalty fees in the Italian legislation on PPCs. According to our 
calibration analysis, there is no evidence that the substantial delays recorded in the execution times 
of Italian PPCs are due to incorrectly set penalty fees. This result opens the way for other 
explanations of delays in Italian PPCs: specifically, we extend our model to investigate the 
probability of enforcing a penalty which we assume negatively affected by the "quality" of the 
judicial system and the discretionality of the court in voiding the rule. Our simulations show that 
the penalty fee is highly sensitive to the "quality" of the judicial system. Specifically referring to the 
Italian case, we show that the optimal penalty should be higher than those set according to the 
present Italian law.  
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This paper provides a general framework to determine the optimal penalty fee to induce a contractor
to respect the contracted delivery date in public procurement contracts (PPCs). We did this by i)
developing a real option model to evaluate the investment timing ￿exibility that the inclusion of a
penalty clause in the contract gives the contractor; ii) investigating the probability of enforcing the
penalty rule which is here assumed to be negatively a⁄ected by the ￿ quality￿of the judicial system
and by the discretionality of the court in voiding the penalty rule itself. Our model shows that the
optimal penalty fee increases as the uncertainty over the contract￿ s investment costs increases and the
probability of the penalty enforcement decreases.
Using parameters which mimic the Italian context, we then calibrate the model to evaluate the
range of penalties set by the Italian legislation on PPCs. According to our calibrations, the optimal
penalty fees result highly sensitive to the ￿ quality￿of the judicial system and to the discretional power
of courts of law: in particular, the optimal penalty for delay in PPCs should be of di⁄erent level in the
di⁄erent Italian macro-regions and, in some cases, much higher than that set according to the present
Italian law.
Keywords: public procurement contracts, penalty fee, investment timing ￿exibility, contract
incompleteness, enforceability of rules.
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11 Introduction
The deterioration of public ￿nance and increase in global competition have forced governments and
public institutions to obtain ￿the best value for money￿through the purchase of goods, works and
services in the form of procurement contracts. E¢ cient public procurement contracts (henceforth
PPCs) are thus emerging as a ￿core necessity for ... the public sector￿ s e⁄ectiveness in obtaining
resources for social spending and/or lowering taxes￿(Dimitri et al., 2006). These contracts have
recently recorded a rapid increase both in number and value, reaching 16% of the GDP in the EU,
and around 20% in the United States.1 However, PPCs have both bene￿ts and costs: the bene￿ts
(e.g. allocative and productive e¢ ciency) can be quickly erased by the costs and all the other
consequences that usually arise from contractual incompleteness.2
Delays in PPC execution times are often a negative by-product; therefore, penalties for delay in
delivering are speci￿cally addressed in the contract by the procurer to provide the contractor the
right incentive to prevent such default.3 Indeed, delays in delivering negatively a⁄ect many of the
actors involved, e.g. they may determine direct costs for the procurer and reduce consumers￿utility.
A typical illustrative example is a PPC for roadway resurfacing, rehabilitation and restoration: if
these activities are undertaken in heavily urbanized areas, they may cause extreme tra¢ c congestion
and severe inconvenience to the travelling public and the business community. Thus, delays in the
completion of these works prolong the negative impact on users (i.e. a social cost), and also
cause overruns in the planned execution costs.4 To avoid these inconveniences, the procurer - a
Contracting Authority, henceforth CA - usually includes in the PPC a penalty fee for each day of
delay the contractor produces in the delivery date.5 However, a contractor may be unwilling to
respect contractual times if its gain from defaulting is larger than the penalty to be paid. The recent
Italian experience of PPCs has highlighted that this issue is relevant: there is puzzling evidence that
consistent delays are still present regardless of the fact that explicit penalty clauses are included
in the contract. Indeed, our simple descriptive analysis6 shows that out of 45,370 completed
contracts in the period 2000-2006, about 78% were completed with delays.This discrepancy raises
the following research questions: a) is there something wrong with the de￿ntion of penalty fees
currently set? b) how should this penalty be optimally set to induce the contractor to respect the
contracted delivery date?
In order to answer these questions, this paper provides a general framework to determine the
optimal penalty fee in a PPC contract. Our starting point is that the inclusion of a penalty
clause gives the contractor - to some extent - the option of deciding the investment timing for
the contract￿ s execution. In order to be e⁄ective, the penalty fee should consider the value of the
investment timing ￿ exibility which, de facto, increases the contract value. To correctly approach
1Note that between 1995 and 2002 PPCs in the EU underwent a 31% increase in value (Dimitri, et al., 2006;
Ch.1.)
See also: http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/publicprocurement/index_en.htm
2The economic and engineering literature give di⁄erent explanations for the main issues arising in PPCs. Most
of the economic analysis on this topic focuses on the information asymmetry concerning production costs between
the supplier and the procurer (La⁄ont and Tirole, 1993) while engineering and construction management analysis
concentrates on the uncertainty which a⁄ects the contract after it has been signed and its e⁄ects on both the supplier
and the procurer (Bartholomew, 1998). For a methodological discussion on contract incompleteness and unforeseen
contingencies see Maskin and Tirole (1999).
3In the economic literature on PPCs, delivery delays in contract execution are often considered along with the
issue of the supplier￿ s performance regarding contracted aims (i.e. quality). See on this Engel A.R. et al. (2006).
4Cost overruns in di⁄erent procurement contracts have been speci￿cally addressed in the seminal paper by Bajari
and Tadelis (2001) and, more recently, by Ganuza (2007).
5According to the actual practice in PPCs, the penalty for delay in contracts execution is a fee per day of delay
usually de￿ned as a percentage of the contract value. As an example, in Italy penalty fees range from 0.03% to
0.1% of the contract value for each day of delay (see Government Decree n. 163/2006 and DPR n. 554/1999). As
far as the united States are concerned, Herbsaman et al. (1995, Table 6, p. 276) show that for PPCs in highway
construction, the Kansas Department of Transportation usually sets penalties ranging from 0:03% to 0:3% of the
contract value for each day of delay. Arditi et al. (1997) show that a similar range of penalty is applied by the
Illinois Department of Transportation.
6See details in Section 2 below, where we present our analysis on the database compiled by the Italian Authority
in charge of controlling PPCs (i.e. Autorit￿ per la Vigilanza sui Contratti Pubblici di Lavori, Servizi e Forniture -
AVCP). See also AVLP (2005).
2the issue, we propose a simple Real Option model which makes it possible to ascertain the value
of option to delay induced by the inclusion of a penalty clause in the contract.7
Moreover, to correctly address the above research questions, we should take into consideration
elements a⁄ecting the enforcement of the penalty rule itself. Following results generally acknowl-
edged in the - scarce - literature on judicial enforcement of contracts, a low probability of penalty
enforcement can arise when:8 i) the court of law - to which the parties refer to for settlement of
the dispute on the penalty payment - has discretionality in reducing, or even in not enforcing, the
committed fee;9 ii) default by the contractor triggers costly and time-consuming litigation. We
include these elements in our model setting the probability of penalty enforcement as related both
to the level of the penalty (as discretionality in enforcement of PPCs by a court of law increases
with the committed penalty￿ s amount) and to a measure of the ￿ quality￿of the judicial system.
This paper mainly refers to two di⁄erent strands of literature. On a formal level, it builds
on the value of ￿ exibility in contract investment timing (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). In regard
to economic literature on judicial enforcement of contracts, our paper stems from studies on the
probability of a penalty rule￿ s enforcement. Referring to Guash et al. (2006) - who investigated
the probability of renegotiation of concession contracts when corruption is present - in our model
we assume that the probability of enforcing the penalty is a⁄ected by the ￿ quality￿of the judicial
system. Speci￿cally, in the calibration of our model we rely - as in Bianco et al. (2005) - on an
indicator of judicial ine¢ ciency which measures the length of ordinary civil trials. The source of
the court￿ s discretionality in enforcing the penalty is discussed by Anderlini et al. (2007) as a way
to recognize ex-post some ex- ante unforseen events10: in our model we assume that the court￿ s
discretionality in enforcing the rule increases with the amount of the committed penalty; that is,
the higher amount of the penalty to be paid by the contractor, the greater the court￿ s probability
of deciding whether to void or enforce the contract.
Our paper shows that the optimal penalty fee to be set in a PPC - i.e. the penalty which should
induce the contractor to respect the contracted delivery date - increases as the uncertainty over the
contract￿ s investment costs increases and the probability of the penalty￿ s enforcement decreases.
The model￿ s theoretical predictions are supported by our calibration results: using parameters
which mimic the Italian context for PPCs, our ￿ndings show that, ￿rst, in accordance with Real
Option Theory, the higher the uncertainty over the future realization of the investment costs, the
higher the penalty fee should be; and, second, the penalty fee should be set by considering the
probability of penalty enforcement which - in turn - is correlated to the discretionality of the court
and to the ￿ quality￿of the judicial system.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2, summarizes a variety of empirical evidence dealing
with delays and the probability of judicial enforcement in Italian PPCs. Section 3 ￿rst describes
a basic model for procurement contracts which includes a penalty rule for delay in completion,
and further then presents simulations carried out adopting a range of parameters which refer
to the Italian empirical evidence in procurement. Finally, Section 4 provides a brief summary
of our ￿ndings policy. Appendix A shows how our base model can be extended to consider a
penalty/premium scheme where the contractor is punished (or rewarded) if it decides to delay
(or anticipate) the delivery date. Appendix B contains additional tables for evidence discussed in
Section 2, and further simulations and ￿gures referring to key parameters of the model.
7As Brennan and Schwartz (1985) and McDonald and Siegel (1985; 1986) highlighted in their seminal works,
there is a close analogy between security options and investment timing ￿exibility.
8In our analysis we assume that delays in delivering the project are always veri￿able; our focus is not on
veri￿ability of delays. A non-veri￿able task could threaten contract enforceability itself (La⁄ont and Martimort,
2002, p.348). To our knowledge, since the seminal paper by Manelli and Vincent (1995), analysis on non-veri￿able
tasks in procurement (and concession) contracts has been carried out - with di⁄ering emphases - by Dalen et al.
(2004), Calzolari and Spagnolo (2006) and Moretto and Valbonesi (2007). Usman (2002) presents a model where
the judicial enforcement of the contract depends on the judge￿ s cost in verifying tasks.
9See Eggleston et al. (2000) for a general discussion of the role of courts in enforcing contract clauses; and
Legros et al. (2002) speci￿cally on the e⁄ects of courts enforcement on parts￿investment, when imperfections in the
￿technology of communication￿are present.
10Usman (2002) shows that the discretional nature of the court￿ s e⁄ort can act strategically in verifying the
contract￿ s contingencies.
32 Delays and penalty enforcement in Italian PPCs
2.1 Empirical evidence of delays in Italian PPCs
To investigate delays in PPCs we accessed the database compiled by the Italian Authority in
charge of controlling these contracts (Autorit￿ per la Vigilanza sui Contratti Pubblici di Lavori,
Servizi e Forniture - AVCP). This database records all public works contracts of a value between
150,000 and 15,000,000 Euros awarded by municipalities, local/regional public authorities and
public ￿rms. At ￿rst glance, our examination of this database highlights that out of 45,370 fully
completed contracts in the period 2000-2006, about 35,312 (corresponding to about 78%) were
completed with delays.
In Table 1A in the Appendix, these contracts are presented with respect to i) the awarding
procedure (open, negotiated and non-classi￿ed - n.c.); ii) their values (from e 150,000 to e 500,000;
from e 500,000 to e 1,000,000; from e 1,000,000 to e 5,000,000; from e 5,000,000 to e 15,000,000;
larger than e 15,000,000) and iii) the regional area where they were carried out (Northern, Central
and Southern Italy).11 It is interesting to note that the number of awarded PPCs is higher in the
Northern part of Italy than in the Central and Southern parts (about three times more than those
awarded in Central and in Southern Italy), and most of these contracts fall in the smallest range of
values (more than 60% of the total PPCs recorded fall in the range between 150,000 and 500,000
Euros).
Italian data shows that the PPCs awarded with an open procedure are more than double those
with a negotiated one. Moreover, the average days of delay does not appear to di⁄er according to
the nature of the awarding procedure itself:12 out of the 30,244 contracts awarded with an open
procedure, about 80% had delays while out of the 13,189 contracts awarded with a negotiated
procedures, 75% had delays.13
Figure 1 illustrates the ratio between the average recorded delay over contracted days for
di⁄erent ranges of contract values. Although in Central and Northern Italy this ratio deacreses
as the value of the contract increases, the correlations between the average recorded delays over
the contract value results (though statistically signi￿cant) very low in any of the three macro-
regions (0.03 in Central Italy, 0.1 in Southern Italy and 0.05 in Northern Italy).14 This suggests
that there is not a functional relationship between delays and contract value; the reduction in the
ratio, illustrated in Figure 1, could simply be due to the reduction in the average days of delay
(numerator) or to an increase in contracted days (denominator) or to a combination of the two.15
11The distinction among these three macro-regions has been made by referring to the de￿nition by the Italian
National Institute of Statistics (Istat) according to which, Italy can be divided in: Northern Italy (which comprises
Piemonte, Valle d￿ Aosta, Liguria, and Lombardia, Trentino-Alto Adige, Veneto, Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Emilia Ro-
magna); 2) Central Italy (Toscana, Umbria, Marche, Lazio); 3) Southern Italy (Abruzzo, Molise, Campania, Puglia,
Basilicata e Calabria, Sicilia, Sardegna).
12Italian regulation on PPCs is slowly adopting the EU rules in force. The four EU procedures for award-
ing procurement are: open procedure, restricted procedure, negotiated procedure and competitive dialogue (see
about:http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l22009.htm). Note that prior than the promulgation of Government
Decree n. 163/2006, in Italy there was a di⁄erent classi￿cation for the awarding procedures which comprised a longer
list of procedures than the one set in the EU regulation, therefore the AVCP database records them accordingly to
the legislation in force during the period 2000-2006 (i.e. Law n. 109/1994 and D.P.R. n. 554/1999). We have here
aggregated these data according to the EU classi￿cation which is currently in force in Italy.
13In principle, delays in the PPC completion time weigh di⁄erently on the contract value depending on the
procedure adopted in awarding. In the ￿negotiated￿ procedure, the contract value is directly agreed between the
parties and includes an explicit trade-o⁄ between the contract value and the investment￿ s delivery time. Instead, in
the ￿open￿procedure, the investment￿ s execution time can itself be part of the successful bid, thus representing a
strategic variable in the competition among bidders. Bajari and Lewis (2009) investigated theoretically and empically
the e⁄ects of awarding separately completion time and contract costs in Minnesota highway procurements. They
highlighted that large improvements in social welfare are possibile through the adoption of the scoring rule where
contractors bid for the two items separately with respect to the case where contractors bid only for contract costs.
14All these three correlations are stastically signi￿cant at 0.01 level.
15Inspections of the database highilight that the high ratio recorded for PPCs in Southern Italy for the range
between 5,000,000 and 15,000,000 Euros seems mainly driven by only one contract for road resurfacing awarded by















Figure 1: Average delayed days over contracted days according to contract location and value
2.2 Judicial enforcement of penalty for delay in Italian PPCs
In the following, we speci￿cally address the probability of judicial enforcement of the rule for delay
in PPC execution. We ￿rst refer to previous analyses where judicial enforcement is related to
the ￿ quality￿of the judicial system and provide empirical evidence for the Italian case. We then
discuss how judicial enforcement is a⁄ected by the discretionality of the court of law in voiding the
penalty rule for delay and, speci￿cally, we refer the discretionality of the court to the amount of
the penalty committed.
Guash et al. (2006) developed a theoretical model where the probability of contract enforcement
is a⁄ected by a parameter referring to the ￿ quality￿(e¢ ciency) of the judicial system: the higher the
judicial ine¢ ciency, the lower the probability of contract enforcement. These theoretical predictions
are broadly consistent with the empirical results obtained by the same authors on concession
contracts for building infrastructure in Latin America (Guasch et al., 2003). Bianco et al. (2005),
investigating credit markets, o⁄ered a simple theoretical model showing that improvements in
judicial e¢ ciency reduce credit rationing and increase lending; their results are supported by
national and international empirical evidence. Indeed, Bianco et al. (2005) empirically highlight
that in Italian provinces with longer trials - or large backlogs of pending trials - credit for ￿rms is
less available.16
In a procurement setting, the key function of a court of law is essentially to force contractors
to pay penalties when they fail to do so. Therefore, poor judicial enforcement - if foreseen - will
increase the contractor￿ s opportunistic behaviour, i.e. the contractor will have de facto an incentive
to delay the completion of the PPC. Thus, in our analysis, we assume that the enforcement of a
penalty is directly related to the average length of judicial processes as the threat of long trials
reduces the probability of enforcement itself.17 Following Bianco et al. (2005), in Table 1 below
16Moreover, at an international level, Bianco et al. (2005) found that the depth of mortgage markets is inversely
related to the costs of mortgage foreclosure and other proxies for judicial e¢ ciency.
17A long trial increases the contractor￿ s and the CA￿ s legal expenses; moreover, for a disputed penalty, the
contract execution may even be suspended, increasing the direct negative externality in￿icted on consumers by slow
completion. For a disputed penalty there could be a further negative e⁄ect for the contractor depending on the
5we show the average length of ordinary civil trials (i.e. the time elapsing between the date of
initial recording of a trial and that of the court￿ s ￿nal sentence) in the three main geographical






Table 1: Average length of ordinary civil trials in Italy, 2005
The average length for Italian civil justice to reach a ￿nal sentence is equal to 850 days, i.e.
more than 2 years. Nevertheless, this ine¢ ciency is distributed di⁄erently across the geographical
macro-regions of Italy. More precisely, the judicial ine¢ ciency in civil trial is very marked in
Southern Italy (1015 average days to reach a ￿nal sentence) compared to both the Northern and
Central regions (respectively 646 and 648 days on average).
A further issue a⁄ecting the probability of enforcement of rules in PPCs is related to the role
played by the court of law as an active player in observing ex-post unforeseen contingencies: in this
context the court could decide whether to void or enforce a contract￿ s rule. If we apply Anderlini
et al.￿ s (2007) analysis to our procurement setting, we can observe similar e⁄ects when committed
penalties for delays in delivery date are signi￿cant: in these cases the court can choose to not enforce
the penalty rule and apply the ￿principle of liquidated damage￿which only considers enforceable
the penalty corresponding to the ￿reasonable damage￿su⁄ered by the procurer (and/or consumers,
etc.). In other words, the probability of enforcement of the penalty by the court is here related
to the level of the committed penalty since the court￿ s discretionality in contract enforcement
increases with the amount of the penalty.
Referring to Italian PPCs, unfortunately, the AVCP database does not provide information
about the level of penalties which have been committed for delays in execution and which have
actually been paid by contractors. However, using the information provided on the delayed days for
each contract￿ s execution and the minimum and maximum level of penalty fees as de￿ned by the
Italian Law (respectively 0.03% and 0.1% of the contract value for each day of delay in delivering
the asset),19 we present in Table 2 the average penalty that should have been committed in Italian
PPCs by range of contract value and macro-regional area. This was done by multiplying the
average number of delayed days for each range of contract values by 0.03% and 0.1% respectively
(i.e. for the minimum and maximum penalty fee for each day of delay set by the Italian Law).
The data in Table 2 show that the percentage of the estimated penalty over the total value
of the PPC tends to increase with contract value except for the very high value projects (over
15,000,000 Euros). This is due to two main facts: ￿rst, according to Italian Law, the penalty is
calculated as a percentage of the contract￿ s value; second, as noted in Figure 1, the ratio of average
delayed days over contracted days decreases with a contract￿ s value. In particular, for very high
value contracts, a reduction in the average delayed days more than compensates for an increase in
the penalty amount.
payment rules adopted: if the payment to the contractor is divided up into the contract￿ s execution stages, a direct
cost for the contractor arises as - given the halt in the PPC execution - it is not fully rewarded.
18For further details, see the following link: http://www.giustizia.it/statistiche/
statistiche_dog/2002/civile/distretti_civ.htm.


























150 to 500 Italy 131.84 273192 15584 51948 5.7% 19.0%
N. Italy 131.63 273942 15338 51129 5.6% 18.7%
C. Italy 204.48 271378 15886 52955 5.9% 19.5%
S. Italy 133.68 272857 15999 53333 5.9% 19.5%
500 to 1000 Italy 173.24 694654 47284 157613 6.8% 22.7%
N. Italy 166.68 696045 46472 154907 6.7% 22.3%
C. Italy 201.71 694666 51806 172687 7.5% 24.9%
S. Italy 167.28 689813 45266 150889 6.6% 21.9%
1000 to 5000 Italy 219.98 1886735 160390 534636 8.5% 28.3%
N. Italy 208.86 1897885 153413 511377 8.1% 26.9%
C. Italy 235.53 1908249 178208 594026 9.3% 31.1%
S. Italy 250.01 1825213 169889 566298 9.3% 31.0%
5000 to 15000 Italy 267.13 7808002 803379 2677931 10.3% 34.3%
N. Italy 258.18 7601970 732416 2441389 9.6% 32.1%
C. Italy 220.05 8173845 814588 2715293 10.0% 33.2%
S. Italy 344.94 8306584 1069027 3563424 12.9% 42.9%
> 15000 Italy 213.93 33941171 3611694 12038981 10.6% 35.5%
N. Italy 184.16 33952771 3164290 10547634 9.3% 31.1%
C. Italy 262.83 44470151 7215423 24051410 16.2% 54.1%
S. Italy 294.75 27977296 3178474 10594914 11.4% 37.9%
Total Italy 150.55 698157 54949 183163 7.9% 26.2%
N. Italy 149.04 734957 55349 184497 7.5% 25.1%
C. Italy 152.65 622972 53353 177843 8.6% 28.5%
S. Italy 153.47 659764 55402 184674 8.4% 28.0%
Table 2: Minimum and maximum penalty in level and percentage over the total amount of
contracts de￿ned according to the DPR n. 554/1999
Given the lack of information in the AVCP database about committed penalties which have
actually been paid - i.e. enforced - we looked at other recent investigations into PPC enforcement
in Italy. These investigations (Albano et al. (2008) and Spagnolo et al. (2008)) which were carried
out on smaller datasets, documented that committed penalties in Italy are enforced in very few
cases.20
3 A model for optimal penalty fee in PPCs
In this section, we consider the case where a Contracting Authority (CA) awards a public pro-
curement contract (PPC) to an economic operator (i.e. a contractor ￿rm) to build a public in-
frastructure with exogenous and ex-ante de￿ned technical characteristics.21 We assume that the
contractor is selected according to a ￿ negotiated￿procedure: that is, the CA ￿rst consults some
economic operators of its choice and then agrees on the terms of the contract with only one of
them.22 Moreover, the project (e.g. the building of a public infrastructure) is of a ￿xed size.23
20Albano et al. (2008) investigated the quality of public expenditure for Italian public administrations and showed
that out of 800 inspectoral checks between September 2006 and April 2007, 437 cases did not comply with the ex-
ante de￿ned standard: of these, in only 16 cases were penalties enforced (3.66%). Spagnolo et al. (2008) reported
that out of 4,095 inspections commissioned by the Italian Public Procurement Agency (CONSIP) in the period
2005-2008, a total of 1,455 contractual infringements by the contractor were ascertained, but penalties were only
exercised in 64 cases (about 4.42%).
21This context does not deal with the issue of delay caused by an erroneous original project. To investigate this
issue, one would have to extend this model with i) a preliminary stage where the CA evaluates the contractor￿ s
proposal and ii) a further stage where the CA controls ex-post the infrastructure￿ s execution.
22This assumption seems to be neutral: indeed, by evidence from the Italian AVCP database, delays are not
correlated to the awarding procedure adopted (see Section 2 above).
23This assumption is in line with our ￿ndings from data on the Italian PPCs - see previous Section 2.1 - about
recorded delays and the contracts￿ s average range value: we found a very low correlation index which results slighty
7According to the PPC, the contractor commits itself to constructing the infrastructure at time
t in return for a ￿xed payment p, which is agreed on by both parties. To keep the model as simple
as possible, we assume that the infrastructure can be built instantaneously, at the estimated cost
Ct ￿ p. Furthermore, the contract includes the contractor￿ s liability for completion on time, i.e. if
the contractor delays the contracted delivery date it will pay a constant penalty c for each period
(i.e. for each day) of delay. In Appendix A we present an extension of our model to the - realistic,
but not frequent - case where the contractor is punished/rewarded if it decides to delay/anticipate
the delivery date, i.e. to the case where the PPC includes a penalty/premium rule.
Under these assumptions, the net bene￿t for a risk-neutral contractor (i.e. the project￿ s Net
Present Value, NPV henceforth) that complies with the contract delivery time is given by:24
Ft = p ￿ Ct ; (1)
where Ct ￿ p is the estimated cost of building the infrastructure at time t; when the contract is
signed.
However, the introduction of the penalty clause gives - de facto - the contractor some ￿ exibility
in deciding its optimal time-to-completion. This investment timing ￿ exibility has a value that
should be added to the project￿ s NPV as expressed in (1). In particular, for the sake of simplicity,
we assume that the project￿ s cost Ct evolves over time according to a geometric Brownian motion:25
dCt = ￿Ctdt + ￿Ctdzt ; (2)
where ￿ R 0 is the drift and ￿ > 0 is the volatility of the cost process. Under this assumption,
the contractor￿ s possibility of deferring the infrastructure￿ s completion date becomes analogous to
a Perpetual Put Option whose value is equal to:
Pt ￿ ￿t ￿ ￿￿t: (3)




. ￿t is the expected and discounted net
bene￿t from investing at a general cost C￿ < Ct, ￿t is the expected value of the penalty at time t,
￿ 2 [0;1] is the probability that a third party - i.e. a court of law - is able to enforce the penalty, r
is the risk-adjusted expected rate of return that investors would require to invest in the project,26
and ￿ is the exercise time of the option.




r , the ex-ante value of the procurement con-











di⁄erent according to geographic area where the PPC is executed (from 0.03 in Central Italy to 0.1 in Southern
Italy, and to 0.05 in Northern Italy).
24The assumption that the project is built instantaneously can be relaxed without substantially altering the
results. Let us assume that it takes ￿time-to-build￿the project but there is a maximum rate k at which the ￿rm can
invest in every period (year). Therefore, denoting the total expenditure with Ct, it takes T = Ct=k periods (years)




ke￿rsds = (1 ￿ e￿rCt=k)
k
r
However, noting that e￿rCt=k ’ 1 ￿ r Ct
k + :::; we get ^ Ct ’ Ct and the analysis can proceed pretty much as in the
text.
25In the following equation, dzt is the increment of a standard Brownian process with mean zero and variance dt
(Dixit, 1993; Dixit and Pindyck, 1994).
26The discount rate r can either be adjusted for risk or the expectation for the discount factor can be taken with
respect to a risk-adjusted probability measure with r as the risk-free discount rate (Cox and Ross, 1976; Harrison
and Kreps, 1979).
27When it is established in the PPC that the CA can revoke the contract if the total penalty reaches an upper






(1 ￿ e￿rT) = Gp
Modelling this option is more complicated than the previous (2) but the results do not substantially di⁄er.
8Furthermore, since Ft is also driven by a geometric Brownian motion, i.e. dFt = ￿(Ft ￿ p)dt +





, where ￿ < 0 is the
negative root of the quadratic equation 1
2￿2x(x￿1)+￿x￿r = 0:28 By substituting the expression














Equation (5) states that for any ￿xed p; whenever Pt > Ft, it will be pro￿table for the contractor
to infringe the contract￿ s provision on the investment￿ s delivery date. In particular, the contractor
will be better o⁄ by maximizing (5) with respect to F￿ in order to determine its optimal delay.








Equation (6) yields the following investment rule: if F￿ ￿ Ft , it is optimal for the contractor
to invest immediately, while if F￿ > Ft , it is optimal to wait until the net bene￿t is equal to
F￿. Finally, if the CA wishes to incentivate the ￿rm to respect the contractual time, it must ￿x a










which, ceteris paribus, depends on ￿;￿ (via ￿) and Ct.
According to (7), if the CA expects a low probability ￿ and/or a high current investment cost
Ct (i.e. for decreasing NPV), it should increase the value of the penalty fee to discourage the ￿rm
from delays. Futhermore, since d((￿ ￿ 1)=￿)=d￿ > 0, according to (7) an increase in uncertainty
would induce the CA to set a higher penalty fee.
We now investigate the probability of the penalty enforcement more deeply: speci￿cally, we
assume that a low probability of penalty enforcement may arise from at least two di⁄erent sources.
First, if the court of law - to which the parties refer in case of dispute - considers the committed
penalty to be ￿excessive￿ , it may decide not to enforce it or to reduce it to an extent estimated
as reasonably covering the damages caused by the contractor￿ s breach.30 In order to include this
case in our model, we assume that the probability of enforcement by the court ￿ depends on the
value of penalty c with the properties that ￿0(c) < 0; ￿(c
ﬂ
) = 1 and limc!1 ￿(c) = 0, where c
ﬂ
￿ 0
represents the minimum time unit value (i.e. fee per day) considered reasonable by the court of
law as ex ante foreseen by the CA.31
A second element a⁄ecting the enforceability of the penalty clause is the ￿ quality￿(e¢ ciency)
of the judicial system. Following Guasch et al. (2006, p.60), we thus multiply the probability ￿(c)
28See Dixit and Pindyck (1994), p. 315-316.







































30In the literature on ￿rm breach of contract, this discretionality by the court of law is commonly referred to as
the ￿liquidated damage principle￿. Delay in delivering the contracted investment should be referred to as a speci￿c
case of the ￿rm￿ s breach of the contract, and the court can apply the above principle to cover the reasonable damage
caused to society by delays. For a discussion of the application of the ￿liquidate damage principle￿in PPCs, see
Dimitri et al. (2004, Ch. 4, pp. 85-86); for an analysis of the economic incentives pertaining to it, see Anderlini et
al. (2007).
31In the US experience of PPC in the highway construction industry, the ￿unit time value￿is typically expressed
as a cost per day. It is calculated by the State highway agency (the CA in our model) referring to the ￿daily
road-user cost￿, which include items such as travel time, travel distance, fuel expense, etc. See Herbsman et al.
(1995) for an example of the ￿daily road-user cost￿calculation used by the Kansas Department of Transportation.
9by a parameter ￿ 2 [0;1] which refers to the average time that the court of law takes to resolve
disputes.32
According to these assumptions on the probability of the penalty￿ s enforcement, the optimal









= 0; for c￿ ￿ c
ﬂ
: (8)
In order to illustrate the properties of (8) with reference to the Italian case, in what follows, we
￿rst provide some numerical solutions (see Tables 3, 4, 5, 6 below) and discuss them referring to
the maximum and minimum value of the penalty fee set by Italian legislation. We further specify
di⁄erent values for ￿ according to data on the average length of ordinary civil trials in di⁄erent
Italian regional areas (see previous Table 1) and compare results for (8) according to the macro
areas where the contracts are executed - Northern and Central Italy vs Southern Italy (see Figures
2, 3, 4, 5 below).
Let us calculate (8). Regarding the probability of enforcement, we assume ￿(c) = (c=c)
￿ for
c ￿ c. In other words, when the CA sets a penalty higher than c
ﬂ
, an increase in elasticity ￿
determines a rapid decrease in probability ￿. If the elasticity is less than one, so that higher values
of c
ﬂ
are deemed excessive by the court, increasing values of both ￿ and Ct lead to higher optimal
penalties. In the calibration, c
ﬂ
takes the values of 0:03% and 0:1%; which are respectively the lower
and upper limits of the penalty fee in PPC as set by Italian legislation while elasticity ￿ takes two
di⁄erent values, ￿ = 0:3 and ￿ = 0:5, respectively.





















The choice of parameters for the calibration is made following as much as possible indications
from related studies (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994; Herbsman et al., 1995; Arditi et al., 1997). The price
of the contracted investment is normalized to one, i.e. p = 1; and the parameters of the model take
the following values: the discount rate33 r = 0:05;34 the investment cost Ct = 0:7;0:8;0:9;￿ = 0;35
and ￿ = 0:3;0:4;0:5.
Finally, interpreting ￿ as the probability that a court of law is able to resolve a dispute in a year,
in order to gauge the e⁄ect of the ￿ quality￿of the judicial system throughout Italy we set 1=￿ = 3
so as to refer to the average number of years the Italian courts take to resolve legal disputes.36
The results of the simulations show that, according to the Real Option Theory, the higher the
investment cost, Ct, and/or the uncertainty, ￿, the higher the optimal penalty c￿. In other words,
both the investment cost Ct and the uncertainty ￿ incentivate the ￿rm to defer the contracted
investment which, in turn, would call for higher penalties to make the ￿rm comply with the
contracted execution time.
32We are aware that the quality of justice is often discussed in the economic literature with reference to many
other dimensions, such as accuracy and costs in pursuing legal actions. Considering only the timing dimension, we
would stress here the relevance of the common saying ￿justice delayed is justice denied￿.
33Although r should be the return that an investor can earn on other investments with comparable risk character-
istics, throughout our analysis we simply refer it to the social rate of discount that the Italian government suggests
should be usedto evalute most public projects. For Italy this ranges between 8% and 12%, with the possibility of
dropping to 5% for projects undertaken in the southern regions (see Pennisi and Scandizzo, 2003).
34We performed other simulations by changing the value of the discount rate, for r = 8%, 10%, 15%. The
simulations for r = 10% are in the Appendix while the others are available from the authors on request.
35Note here that because of the Markov property of (2), the quality of all subsequent results does not change for
any non-zero trend of costs as long as ￿ < r. In fact, the presence of any non-zero trend would change the option
to wait. Therefore a ￿ < 0 would strenghten the ￿rm￿ s desire not to comply with the contractual time.
36Here we refer to the average duration of a civil trial in Italy (Table 1) because the civil court of law is the forum
authorized to deal with these disputes. Note that the average duration of a civil trial adopted in the calibration is
consistent with the period our dataset on Italian PPCs refers to.
10Tables 3 and 4 below show the optimal penalties obtained by simulations of (9) for c = 0:03%,
and ￿ = 0:3 and ￿ = 0:5 respectively, while Tables 5 and 6 show the optimal penalties obtained
by simulations of (9) for c = 0:1%, and ￿ = 0:3 and ￿ = 0:5 respectively. In all these Tables it
can be observed that the higher the values of Ct and ￿, the higher the optimal penalty c￿. In
addition, it is evident that the optimal penalties are highly sensitive to the values of both c and ￿.
Speci￿cally, when the value of the penalty considered reasonable by the court of law is c = 0:03%
, if the elasticity of the probability is ￿ = 0:3 or ￿ = 0:5 (Table 3 and 4), the optimal penalty
c￿ always exceeds c. In these cases c is sub-optimal, and would induce the contractor to delay
the investment. This delay would increase as the NPV decreases (Tables 3 and 4). By contrast,
when the value of the reasonable penalty by the court of law is c = 0:1%, if the elasticity of the
probability is ￿ = 0:3 (Table 5), the optimal penalty c￿ is higher than 0:1% only for a high value
of Ct and/or ￿. In all the other cases, the CA will ￿nd it convenient to set the penalty fee equal
to 0:1% and the contractor will ￿nd it convenient to comply with the contractual delivery date.
In olther words, the penalty fee is correctly set and the probability of enforcement is equal to 1
(perfect enforceability). Note that all the results according to which the CA ￿nds it convenient to
set the fee equal to c are in the Tables highlighted in yellow.
The results displayed in Table 6 show that for ￿ = 0:5, the CA ￿nds it convenient to set the
fee which presumes reasonable for the court (i.e. to set c = 0:1%) only when Ct = 0:7 and ￿ = 0:3
(i.e for greater NPV and lower volatility); in all other cases the optimal penalty is always greater
than 0.1%.
To sum up, if a ￿rm￿ s pro￿tability on signing a contract is high and the volatility on future
investment costs, Ct, is low, the contractor will not defer the investment. This allows the CA
to set the penalty equal to the one proposed by the court. On the contrary, if the NPV is low
and the volatility is high, the contractor will ￿nd it convenient to defer the investments, and by
contrast the CA will set a penalty higher than c in order to induce the contractor to comply with
the contracted delivery date.37
Table 3: Optimal penalty for di⁄erent values of Ct and ￿; c = 0:03%, ￿ = 1=3;￿ = 0, r = 5%,
￿ = 0:3 expressed in percentage and in terms of days
Table 4: Optimal penalty for di⁄erent values of Ct and ￿, c = 0:03%, ￿ = 1=3;￿ = 0, r = 5%,
￿ = 0:5 expressed in percentage and in terms of days
37All the results still hold if we consider ￿ < 0 (see Appendix). Assuming ￿ < 0 emphasizes the results according
to which the optimal penalty is always greater than c except when c = 0:1%, ￿ = 0:3, Ct = 0:7 and ￿ = 0:3. In
this case the optimal penalty is always less than c = 0:1%, so that the CA ￿nds it optimal to set the penalty equal
to c.There is only one case where the optimal penalty is less than 0.1%: when c = 0:03%, ￿ = 0:5, Ct = 0:7 and
￿ = 0:3.
11Table 5: Optimal penalty for di⁄erent values of Ct and ￿, c = 0:1%, ￿ = 1=3;￿ = 0, r = 5%,
￿ = 0:3 expressed in percentage and in terms of days
Table 6: Optimal penalty for di⁄erent values of Ct and ￿; c = 0:1%, ￿ = 1=3;￿ = 0, r = 5%,
￿ = 0:5 expressed in percentage and in terms of days
Finally, we perform simulations to test the e⁄ects of the quality of the judicial system on the
optimal penalty (Figure 2, 3, 4, 5). As outlined in Section 2.2, the average length of ordinary civil
trials in the three Italian macro-regions are very similar for Northern and Central Italy (which can
be therefore considered together) and shorter than in the South. Therefore, referring to Table 1,
we assumed ￿ = 0:5 for Northern and Central Italy (NCI henceforth), and ￿ = 0:25 for Southern
Italy (SI henceforth) respectively. These parameters imply that the average length of ordinary civil
trials is respectively 1=￿ = 2 years for NCI and 1=￿ = 4 years for SI.
The results obtained for the case of Italy do not vary qualitatively if we consider NCI and SI
separately: the optimal penalty in both cases increases monotonically in Ct and ￿. However, it is
important to stress here that the optimal penalty decreases for increasing value of ￿: indeed, note
that in the Figures below the plane for ￿ = 0:5 lays always below that for ￿ = 0:25. Figures 2, 3,
4, 5, show that i) the optimal penalty set for PPCs awarded and executed in SI should always be
greater than the one set in NCI; ii) the spread between the optimal penalty in NCI and the one
in SI increases for increasing values of Ct (i.e. decreasing NPV) and ￿.
These ￿ndings are consistent with the empirical evidence on delays reported in the AVCP￿ s
survey on Italian PPCs. Indeed, according to the AVCP￿ s dataset, the SI records on average the
highest number of delayed days. This reveals that, because the penalty fee is not di⁄erentiated by
regional areas, in SI contractors ￿nd it optimal to delay the delivery date more frequently than in
NCI.38
38As shown in the Appendix, the results for NCI and SI respectively still hold if we consider ￿ < 0. Analogous
considerations hold for ￿ = 0:5 and ￿ = 0:25.
12Figure 2: Optimal penalties expressed in percentage and in terms of days for c = 0:03%;￿ = 0:3,
with respect to increasing ￿ and Ct
Figure 3: Optimal penalties expressed in percentage and in terms of days for c = 0:03%;￿ = 0:5,
with respect to increasing ￿ and Ct
13Figure 4: Optimal penalties expressed in percentage and in terms of days for c = 0:1%;￿ = 0:3,
with respect to increasing ￿ and Ct
Figure 5: Optimal penalties expressed in percentage and in terms of days for c = 0:1%;￿ = 0:5,
with respect to increasing ￿ and Ct
14Finally, it is important to consider the dynamics of the optimal penalties speci￿cally considering
the two variables analysed here: the NPV (p ￿ Ct) and the uncertainty e⁄ect (￿) focusing on the
spread between NCI and SI optimal penalties. In this regard, it can be noted that the pro￿tability
e⁄ect is stronger than the uncertainty e⁄ect (the plane with ￿ = 0:25 increases more sharply than
the plane with ￿ = 0:5). This seems to suggest that the lower the NPV (the higher Ct), the longer
the delay and, consequently, the higher the optimal penalty should be. Referring to the Italian
macro-regions, this means that a low pro￿tability contract in the SI exhibits more delayed days
than in NCI, ceteris paribus: this result is explained in our model by a less e¢ cient judicial system
in SI, which implies a low probability that the penalty will be enforced and, consequently, paid.
4 Final remarks
Delays in investment execution are a negative by-product of public procurement because they can:
i) increase the original costs of the contract, thus producing direct negative e⁄ects for the CA;
ii) in￿ ict a negative externality on consumers which would directly bene￿t from the contract￿ s
completion. This is a relevant issue for the performance of PPCs in Italy where - as documented
in Section 2 - about 78% of contracts awarded in the period 2000-2006 were executed with delays.
In many countries procurement contracts usually include penalty clauses for each day of delay
to induce the contractor to respect the contracted delivery timing. To date, the e⁄ectiveness of
penalty rules for delay in PPC, has never been speci￿cally investigated. Our paper takes a step
in this direction, answering the following research questions: given the evidence of long delays,
is there something wrong with the de￿nition of these penalty clauses? How should the optimal
penalty fee be determined?
We presented a model starting from the assumption that penalty clauses give - to some extent -
the contractor the option of deciding the investment timing for the PPC￿ s execution. To be ￿opti-
mally￿set, these penalties should take into account the value of this investment timing ￿ exibility,
which then a⁄ects the contract￿ s value. Adopting a Real Option approach, our model illustrates
that uncertainty over investment costs increases the penalty fee set to induce the contractor to
respect the delivery timing.
Moreover, our model investigates whether the ine¢ ciency of penalty rules is caused by di¢ -
culties in their enforcement. For this purpose, we speci￿cally explored judicial ine¢ ciency of the
penalty enforcement in two directions. First of all, we assumed that the court￿ s discretionality
in enforcing the penalty increases with the committed penalty, and this - in turn - reduces the
probability of penalty enforcement. Secondly, we assumed that the penalty enforcement is lower as
the ￿ quality￿of the judicial system decreases. As a measure of the ￿ quality￿of the judicial system
we adopted the average length of ordinary civil trials: the longer the average length of trials, the
lower the ￿ quality￿of the judicial system.
The model￿ s predictions on penalty enforcement received support from calibrations we perform
on the Italian case: our ￿ndings show that i) the higher the investment cost, Ct, and/or the
uncertainty, ￿, the higher the optimal penalty c￿ and ii) the optimal penalty is highly sensitive
to the ￿ quality￿of the judicial system and to the discretional power of the court. As the average
￿ quality￿of the judicial system di⁄ers among the Italian macro-regions (see Table 1), our results
record di⁄erent levels of optimal penalty for the Northern and Central parts of Italy (NCI) and
the Southern part (SI). Speci￿cally, the optimal penalty to be set for PPCs in SI should always be
greater than the one to be set in NCI, ceteris paribus.
We also found that the spread between the optimal penalty in NCI and in SI increases for
increasing values of the investment cost Ct (i.e. decreasing pro￿tability) and uncertainty ￿. Nev-
ertheless, the pro￿tability of investments weighs more than the uncertainty (the spread increases
more slightly with respect to ￿ than Ct ). This means that when the pro￿tability decreases, the
delay increases, and consequently this would call for a higher optimal penalty in SI than in NCI.
Thus, as for the Italian case, the theoretical predictions of our simple model and its calibration
seem to explain the evidence of the puzzling ine¢ ciency of the penalty rule for delays in the PPCs.
At present, the excessive length of ordinary civil trials in Italian judicial districts is common
15knowledge for all the economic agents: on this ground, if a contractor expects that the CA will not
apply to the court to enforce a disputed penalty for delay in completion, it will optimally delay the
investment, looking forward - at best - to a renegotiation of the contract with the CA. Moreover,
if the contractor considers the case where the CA will apply to the court to enforce the disputed
penalty, it knows that the higher the value of the committed penalty, the larger the discretionality
of the court in reducing, or even in not enforcing, the committed penalty. These e⁄ects would
invalidate the direct incentives produced by the rule itself and would - in some cases - call for
higher optimal penalties than those set according to the Italian regulation on public procurement
contracts.
16A Appendix
A.1 A penalty/premium model
In Section 3 we investigated how a PPC should comprise a penalty clause for delay designed to
optimally induce the contractor to invest at contracted time t. Many PPCs, however, commit the
contractor to invest at a future date t0 > t and also include an incentive/disincentive (I/D) clause
stating that, on the one hand, if the contractor is able to complete the project ahead of schedule t0
it will be entitled to premium fee I whilst, on the other hand, if the contractor delays completion,
a penalty D will be imposed.
Although the CA may introduce di⁄erent and alternative I/D designs, we consider here the
simplest one where the ￿rm receives a constant premium/penalty fee c for each period (day, month,
year, etc.) with which it anticipates/delays the investment with respect to t0 > t:39 In other
words, the present section investigates how this I/D rule - where the premium and the penalty are
identically de￿ned in their amounts, but with opposite signs - should be optimally designed.
Following the approach presented in section 3, the current NPV, say N, of the project for the
contractor complying with the contractual delivery time now becomes:40











where ￿ = r ￿ ￿:41
The inclusion in the procurement contract of an I/D rule makes the contractor￿ s investment
decision equivalent to exercising a Perpetual Put Option whose value is now given by Pt ￿ ￿t￿￿￿t;















where the expected value Et is calculated with respect to both ￿ and the probability that ￿ is
lower (greater) than t0:
39Herbsman et al., 1995 pointed out that in the real world when CAs adopt the I/D rule, the same value for both
the incentive and the disincentive fee is generally used.
40Note that if t0 is set by the CA to allow the contractor to maximize the NPV (10), depending on the parameter















which is an increasing function of the current investment cost Ct and is always greater than t if ￿
r <
p
Ct : In the
case of r = ￿; we get Nt = e￿r(t0￿t)Ft: Since Ft > 0 it is optimal to invest immediately, i.e. t0 = t. If r > ￿ the
solution of the ￿rst order condition represents a minimum as @2Nt
@(t0)2 > 0 and the optimal value coincides with one of
the boundaries, i.e. it is given by max[Ft;limt0!1 Nt]: However, since limt0!1 Nt = 0 it is still optimal to invest
immediately.
41The term r ￿ ￿ can be interpreted as the certainty-equivalent rate of return (see Mc Donald and Siegel, 1984;
Dixit and Pindyck, 1994).



































































where the optimal exercise time ￿ is de￿ned as
￿ = min(t ￿ 0 j F￿ = argmaxPt) (13)
According to (13), at time t, the probability of having a bonus is the probability of having an
optimal exercise time ￿ less than (or equal to) the contractual time t0. In other words, this is
the probability of the geometric Brownian motion Ft reaching the critical value F￿
￿ within [t; t0]
starting from an initial condition Ft < F￿
￿ . This can be expressed as (Harrison, 1985)























































































which should be maximized with respect to F￿: From (15), if the contractual time is very long, i.e.
t0 ! 1, the second term on the left hand side (l.h.s.) disappears and the contractor will get the
premium by investing before t0 with probability one. If, conversely, the contractual time t0 is very
short, i.e. t0 ! t; the second term on the l.h.s. of (15) decreases to c
r as in (5). The contractor
will then incur a penalty since, with probability one, it invests when the contractual time is over.
Finally, because the term c
re￿r(t
0￿t) enters (15) as a constant, the optimal investment trigger F￿
is still given by (6) as well as the ￿rm￿ s investment decision rule. In other words, the contractor
defers the infrastructure delivery date until Ft reaches trigger F￿ for the ￿rst time. In this respect,
if exercise time ￿ is lower than t0, the contractor gains a premium, otherwise it must pay a fee.
As in the text, whenever Pt > Nt it will be pro￿table for the contractor to infringe the contrac-
tual time t0: Thus, the di⁄erence Pt ￿Nt represents the contractor￿ s opportunity cost in delivering
18the investment according to the contracted date t0 instead of taking advantage of the investment
timing ￿ exibility which pertains to the I/D clause.
We complete the analysis by calculating the optimal I/D fee which induces the contractor to
respect the completion date t0. In this regard, since the exercise time ￿ is stochastic and c is
constant (i.e. c is not contingent on ￿), the CA must set a policy-rule referring to the probability
distribution of ￿. For the sake of simplicity, we follow the simple average-time rule42:
E(￿) = t0 (16)
In this case, the mean time that Ft, with starting point Ft > F￿; takes to reach the upper trigger
F￿ for the ￿rst time is given by:






with m ￿ (1
2￿2 ￿ (r ￿ ￿) > 0 and C￿ = p ￿ F￿:43
To obtain (17), we consider the process Ct on an interval 0 < a < Ct < b < 1; with left
boundary a and right boundary b: De￿ning ta;b as the stochastic variable that describes the time it




































where ￿ = 1 ￿
2(r￿￿)
￿2 :Since ￿ > 0; for b ! 1 and a ! C￿ < Ct we obtain the expected time that
the construction cost will take to reach the lower boundary C￿ starting from Ct:
lim
a!C￿;b!1




























































































































































42Depending on di⁄erent assumptions about the CA￿ s risk aversion, this rule can be made more stringent by
giving greater weights to di⁄erent moments in the delivery timing distribution.
43Obviously m should be positive; otherwise E(￿) = 1 (see Cox and Miller, 1965, p. 221-222).











Since when t0 = t and t0 > t, (18) is respectively equal to or smaller than (7), the results obtained in
the previous section can be replicated for the I/D scheme as well. It is worth noting that as (t0 ￿ t)
increases, the optimal I/D fee diminishes. In other words, when the contractual time t0 is a long
way from the current time t; the incentive for the contractor to delay the investment decreases and
the CA is able to minimize premium outpayment by undercutting the I/D fee. When the interval
t0 ￿ t is very long, we have the paradox that the contractor must somehow be incentivated, by
means of an incentive fee, to respect the contracted delivery date for the investment.
20A.2 Other Tables and Simulations
This Appendix includes: Tables on the empirical evidence discussed in Section 2; simulations and




























Italy (4) 20679 16060 (78%) 380.3 135.4 188.2 0.89 1.56
N. Italy 11737 9136 (78%) 369.1 134.1 180.6 0.95 1.75
C. Italy 3963 3082 (78%) 389.7 138.0 197.3 0.87 1.39
S. Italy 4975 3841 (77%) 399.4 136.3 198.4 0.79 1.10
500 to
1000
Italy (2) 5482 4516 (82%) 512.2 171.1 209.9 0.78 1.79
N. Italy 3359 2768 (82%) 501.8 169.0 207.2 0.81 2.13
C. Italy 941 790 (84%) 537.5 190.5 212.6 0.77 0.98
S. Italy 1180 958 (81%) 521.2 162.0 214.5 0.68 1.11
1000 to
5000
Italy (7) 3793 3230 (85%) 676.3 221.6 256.7 0.74 1.5
N. Italy 2458 2070 (84%) 651.2 207.4 242.3 0.73 1.47
C. Italy 587 507 (86%) 720.5 244.4 265.4 0.78 1.98
S. Italy 741 649 (88%) 724.9 252.3 290.6 0.74 1.13
5000 to
15000
Italy (0) 226 189 (84%) 867.5 246.5 276.2 0.57 0.84
N. Italy 160 133 (83%) 862.4 240.5 246.8 0.50 0.62
C. Italy 30 24 (80%) 804.1 150.6 261.7 0.32 0.47
S. Italy 36 32 (89%) 936.1 353.6 370.3 1.06 1.52
> 15000 Italy (0) 64 52 (81%) 951.6 209.2 273.2 0.43 0.71
N. Italy 53 43 (81%) 927.3 192.8 265.0 0.42 0.76
C. Italy 5 4 (80%) 1433.5 339.4 383.1 0.48 0.61
S. Italy 6 5 (83%) 774.6 246.2 265.9 0.47 0.43
Total Italy (13) 30244 24047 (80%) 449.93 153.64 205.27 0.85 1.59
N. Italy 17767 14150 (80%) 442.69 152.00 198.22 0.89 1.78
C. Italy 5526 4407 (80%) 457.51 158.46 211.74 0.84 1.40
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Italy (0) 9410 6842 (73%) 383.6 131.5 198.1 0.90 1.62
N. Italy 5517 4128 (75%) 377.5 137.2 191.2 0.96 1.65
C. Italy 2832 1962 (69%) 391.8 123.2 214.5 0.80 1.63
S. Italy 1061 752 (71%) 395.4 123.8 186.1 0.82 1.47
500 to
1000
Italy (0) 2137 1739 (81%) 539.8 179.6 262.6 0.80 1.35
N. Italy 1445 1139 (79%) 523.3 162.8 254.9 0.79 1.44
C. Italy 490 421 (86%) 573.5 222.0 278.0 0.82 1.04
S. Italy 202 179 (89%) 565.6 197.1 267.0 0.77 1.27
1000 to
5000
Italy (4) 1470 1199 (82%) 711.2 220.6 271.4 0.69 1.10
N. Italy 996 814 (82%) 696.6 217.5 268.2 0.70 1.06
C. Italy 308 250 (81%) 744.1 222.4 286.9 0.61 0.79
S. Italy 162 134 (83%) 742.0 241.6 262.7 0.78 1.68
5000 to
15000
Italy (0) 140 121 (86%) 979.0 308.4 302.5 0.65 1.12
N. Italy 86 77 (90%) 953.7 296.0 264.6 0.57 0.58
C. Italy 26 21 (81%) 1026.5 322.1 334.7 0.55 0.54
S. Italy 28 23 (82%) 1020.6 333.8 381.7 1.00 2.23
> 15000 Italy (0) 32 25 (78%) 1148.0 249.3 492.5 0.40 0.64
N. Italy 12 10 (83%) 927.9 191.3 219.8 0.32 0.32
C. Italy 7 5 (71%) 1493.8 208.1 688.0 0.35 0.68
S. Italy 13 10 (77%) 1195.2 325.0 578.7 0.51 0.84
Total Italy (4) 13189 9926 (75%) 459.72 151.38 223.91 0.86 1.53
N. Italy 8056 6168 (77%) 454.65 153.50 217.50 0.89 1.55
C. Italy 3663 2659 (73%) 460.80 146.34 237.15 0.79 1.50
Negotiated
S. Italy 1466 1098 (75%) 485.81 152.75 224.73 0.81 1.48
Table 1A- part I: Contracts awarded by procedure, range value, and location
21Table 1A- part II: Contracts awarded by procedure, range value, and location
22A.2.2 Other simulations
Here we report other simulations of the optimal penalty by changing some key parameters. Tables
2A, 3A, 4A, 5A display the results of simulations obtained for the Italian case (i.e. 1=￿ = 3) when
￿ < 0, r = 0:1% and ￿ = 0:3,0:4;0:5. Tables 6A, 7A, 8A, 9A display the results of simulations
obtained for the Italian case (i.e. 1=￿ = 3) when ￿ < ￿0:05 and r = 0:5%. Tables 10A, 11A, 12A,
13A display the results of simulations obtained for the Italian case (i.e. 1=￿ = 3) when ￿ < ￿0:05
and r = 0:5%. Tables 10A, 11A, 12A, 13A.
Figures 1A illustrates the optimal penalty obtained for the NCI (i.e. 1=￿ = 2) and SI (i.e.
1=￿ = 4) when ￿ = 0 and r = 0:1%. Figures 2A and 3A illustrate the optimal penalty obtained
for the NCI (i.e. 1=￿ = 2) and SI (i.e. 1=￿ = 4) when ￿ < 0 and r = 5%;10% respectively.
Table 2A: Optimal penalty for di⁄erent values of Ct and ￿; c = 0:03%, ￿ = 1=3;￿ = 0, r = 10%,
￿ = 0:3 expressed in pecentage and in terms of days
Table 3A: Optimal penalty for di⁄erent values of Ct and ￿; c = 0:03%, ￿ = 1=3;￿ = 0, r = 10%,
￿ = 0:5 expressed in pecentage and in terms of days
Table 4A: Optimal penalty for di⁄erent values of Ct and ￿; c = 0:1%, ￿ = 1=3;￿ = 0, r = 10%,
￿ = 0:3 expressed in percentage and in terms of days
Table 5A: Optimal penalty for di⁄erent values of Ct and ￿; c = 0:1%, ￿ = 1=3;￿ = 0, r = 10%,
￿ = 0:5 expressed in percentage and in terms of days
23Table 6A: Optimal penalty for di⁄erent values of Ct and ￿; c = 0:03%, ￿ = 1=3;￿ = ￿0:05,
r = 5%, ￿ = 0:3 expressed in percentage and in terms of days
Table 7A: Optimal penalty for di⁄erent values of Ct and ￿; c = 0:03%, ￿ = 1=3;￿ = ￿0:05,
r = 5%, ￿ = 0:5 expressed in percentage and in terms of days
Table 8A: Optimal penalty for di⁄erent values of Ct and ￿; c = 0:1%, ￿ = 1=3;￿ = ￿0:05,
r = 5%, ￿ = 0:3 expressed in percentage and in terms of days
Table 9A: Optimal penalty for di⁄erent values of Ct and ￿; c = 0:1%, ￿ = 1=3;￿ = ￿0:05,
r = 5%, ￿ = 0:5 expressed in percentage and in terms of days
Table 10A: Optimal penalty for di⁄erent values of Ct and ￿; c = 0:03%, ￿ = 1=3;￿ = ￿0:05,
r = 5%, ￿ = 0:3 expressed in percentage and in terms of days
24Table 11A: Optimal penalty for di⁄erent values of Ct and ￿; c = 0:03%, ￿ = 1=3;￿ = ￿0:05,
r = 10%, ￿ = 0:5 expressed in percentage and in terms of days
Table 12A: Optimal penalty for di⁄erent values of Ct and ￿; c = 0:1%, ￿ = 1=3;￿ = ￿0:05,
r = 5%, ￿ = 0:3 expressed in percentage and in terms of days
Table 13A: Optimal penalty for di⁄erent values of Ct and ￿; c = 0:1%, ￿ = 1=3;￿ = ￿0:05,
r = 5%, ￿ = 0:5 expressed in percentage and in terms of days
25Figure 1A: Optimal penalty expressed in percentage and in terms of days for r = 0:1, ￿ = 0
and ￿ = 0:25 (SI), ￿ = 0:5 (NCI) by increasing volatility ￿ and Ct. In quadrant I ￿ = 0:3; c
= 0:03%; in quadrant II ￿ = 0:3; c = 0:1%; in quadrant III ￿ = 0:5; c = 0:03%; in quadrant IV
￿ = 0:5; c = 0:1%
26Figure 2A: Optimal penalty expressed in percentage and in terms of days for r = 0:05, ￿ =
￿0:05 and ￿ = 0:25 (SI), ￿ = 0:5 (NCI) by increasing volatility ￿ and Ct. In quadrant I ￿ = 0:3; c
= 0:03%; in quadrant II ￿ = 0:3; c = 0:1%; in quadrant III ￿ = 0:5; c = 0:03%; in quadrant IV
￿ = 0:5; c = 0:1%
27Figure 3A: Optimal penalty expressed in percentage and in terms of days for r = 0:1, ￿ = ￿0:05
and ￿ = 0:25 (SI), ￿ = 0:5 (NCI) by increasing volatility ￿ and Ct. In quadrant I ￿ = 0:3; c
= 0:03%; in quadrant II ￿ = 0:3; c = 0:1%; in quadrant III ￿ = 0:5; c = 0:03%; in quadrant IV
￿ = 0:5; c = 0:1%
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